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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellant State of New Union filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of New Union seeking
review under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1980) and under the
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
On June 2, 2011, the district court granted the United States’
motion for summary judgment on the Clean Water Act counts
and denied New Union’s summary judgment motion. The district
court’s order is a final decision, and jurisdiction is proper in this
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. Whether the State of New Union has standing in its
sovereign capacity as owner and regulator of groundwater within
the state or in its parens patriae capacity as protector of its
citizens who have an interest in the groundwater in the state.
II. Whether Lake Temp is a navigable water as required
under the Clean Water Act sections 301(a), 404(a), and 502(7)
when it is not traditionally navigable, it is isolated from any
navigable-in-fact waters, and it has no substantial impact on
interstate commerce.
III. If Lake Temp is a navigable water, whether the Army
Corps. of Engineers has jurisdiction to issue a permit under
section 404 of the Clean Water Act for the Department of
Defense’s discharge of slurry, a fill material, into the Lake.
IV. Whether the Office of Management and Budget’s
involvement with the permitting decision violated the Clean
Water Act when the Director is compelled to resolve disputes at
the request of the Administrator under Executive Order 12,088,
and whether the ultimate permitting decision was proper under
the Act.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final order of the District Court for
the District of New Union granting the United States’ motion for
summary judgment and denying New Union’s motion for
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summary judgment. R. 10. The State of New Union petitioned
the court for review of the issuance of a permit by the United
States Army Corps of Engineers (COE) under section 404 of the
Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1987), to the United
States Department of Defense (DOD) to allow for the discharge of
a slurry of spent munitions into Lake Temp. R. 3. The State of
Progress intervened as an interested party because the entirety of
Lake Temp and a majority of the Imhoff Aquifer are located
within the boundaries of Progress. Id.
Following discovery, the Secretary of the Army, representing
the United States, filed a motion for summary judgment. R. 5.
New Union and Progress both filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. Id. The district court found that New Union did not
have standing to challenge the issuance of the section 404 permit,
that the COE had jurisdiction to issue a section 404 permit, and
that participation by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) in resolving the dispute between the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the COE did not violate the CWA.
R. 10-11.
New Union filed a Notice of Appeal challenging all three
holdings of the district court. R. 1. Progress filed a Notice of
Appeal challenging the district court’s finding that New Union
did not have standing to challenge the issuance of the section 404
permit and challenging the district court’s holding that the COE
had jurisdiction to issue the section 404 permit. Id.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The COE issued a permit to the DOD pursuant to Section
404 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (c), and (e)(1). R. 1. This
permit authorized the DOD’s plan to discharge non-explosive
munitions in the form of slurry to the dry bed of Lake Temp, an
intermittent, isolated body of water wholly within the state of
Progress. R. 3-4. The EPA agreed with and participated in the
COE’s interpretation of the facts and grant of the permit. R. 9.
The OMB, through power granted by the executive branch under
Executive Order 12,088, resolved an issue between the EPA and
the COE. After the resolution, the EPA made no effort to veto the
COE’s permit. R. 10.
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The proposed process will raise the lakebed several feet,
which will extend the lake’s water elevation six feet and surface
area by two square miles. R. 4. Currently, twenty-seven square
miles is the largest the lake gets during the rainy season. R. 3-4.
It is much smaller during dry years, and one out of five years it is
wholly dry. R. 4. Surface water flows into the lake from a
watershed of surrounding mountains located primarily in
Progress. Id. The DOD’s plan includes continually grading the
lakebed edges so that this runoff will be unimpeded. Id.
Ultimately, the runoff’s alluvial deposits will re-cover the lakebed
and, although at a higher elevation, it will essentially return it to
its present ecological condition. R. 4-5.
Along both sides of a Progress state highway adjacent to, and
about one hundred feet away from, the lake, the DOD posted no
trespassing and danger signs. R. 4. Despite the signs, over the
last century, it is conjectured that a yearly average of about ten
hunters, a majority of whom are residents of Progress, use the
lake to hunt migratory ducks. R. 4.
There is an aquifer one thousand feet below Lake Temp and
five percent of it is located in New Union. R. 4. One of New
Union’s citizens, Dale Bompers, owns, operates, and resides on a
ranch in New Union above the aquifer. R. 4, 6. Currently the
aquifer is not potable or usable in agriculture without treatment
due to a high level of sulfur. Id. A New Union statute requires
citizens to acquire a permit to use the groundwater as a means of
regulating withdrawals and for water conservation. R. 6. There is
no evidence presented on the timing and severity of the
pollution’s impact on the portion of the aquifer beneath New
Union. R. 5-6. Installing and operating wells could collect this
data, but the DOD admits that they will not grant access for nonmilitary purposes; thus, New Union never filed a permit with the
DOD for installation. R. 6. At this point, the wells would not
yield any conclusive data until after the activity is underway. R.
6.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court rendered summary judgment in Defendant
United States’ favor. This Court reviews district court decisions
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granting summary judgment de novo. PCI Transp. Inc. v. Fort
Worth & W. R.R. Co., 418 F.3d 535, 540 (5th Cir. 2005). The
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs the review of agency
decisions. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1966). The Act grants federal
courts the authority to “hold unlawful and set aside” agency
actions that are found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State of New Union establishes standing both in its
sovereign capacity as owner and regulator of groundwater within
its boundaries and in its parens patriae capacity to protect the
interests of its citizens. New Union’s standing in sovereign
capacity is achieved through seeking adjudication of a dispute
over water rights within the State’s borders. New Union’s
procedural right to seek judicial review through the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) subjects a state to a relaxed
standing test. New Union has a reasonable fear it will suffer
injury through the contamination of its groundwater—precisely
the type of injury that the CWA seeks to prevent.
New Union establishes parens patriae standing because the
State’s interest in preserving the integrity of the groundwater
within its boundaries is separate from any interests of private
parties. Also, the State’s interests in protecting the physical and
economic well-being of their residents as well as their rightful
role in the federal system are both quasi-sovereign interests.
There is reasonable fear that Dale Bompers, a resident of New
Union, will suffer injury because the dumping of slurry into Lake
Temp could percolate into the aquifer and affect the groundwater.
This potential contamination could reach a sufficient segment of
the population to establish parens patriae standing. This is
clearly an issue that New Union, if it were able to, would seek to
prevent through its sovereign lawmaking ability. Furthermore,
private individuals are unlikely to obtain satisfactory relief
through lawsuits. These elements solidify New Union’s parens
patriae standing.
Regardless of New Union’s standing, the state is unable to
contest the permit because Lake Temp is not navigable as

5

2012]

BEST BRIEF: APPELLEE

107

required under 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) (1995), 1344(a), and 1362(7)
(2008), thus there is no need for any CWA permit. Navigability
was written into the statute with a dual purpose: to focus the
efforts of raising water quality on connected waters that are most
likely to affect one another and to be consistent with the
Constitution by limiting any extensive encroachment on state
powers. Lake Temp is not navigable because it does not meet the
statutory text, the case law interpretations, or the regulatory
definitions. Furthermore, an extension of jurisdiction to nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters that could potentially affect
interstate commerce exceeds the CWA’s statutory authority and
violates the Constitution.
Given the context in which navigability appears in the CWA
and the inherent constitutional limitations, the COE’s attempt to
extend jurisdiction to isolated waters that have a potential effect
on interstate commerce is unconstitutional. The chosen statutory
term, “navigable,” is absent from and incompatible with all of the
characteristics of Lake Temp. This leads to the conclusion that
not only is the interstate commerce regulatory definition not met,
it is an unconstitutional extension of the COE’s jurisdiction.
If Lake Temp is within the jurisdiction of the CWA, then the
DOD’s discharge of slurry into the lake is properly permitted
under section 404 of the Act. Section 402 provides that the
Administrator may permit discharges that are not subject to
Section 404 of the Act. Congress delegated authority to permit
dredge and fill material discharges to the COE in Section 404.
The DOD’s discharge of slurry is a fill material under the
regulations of both the EPA and the COE because it has the effect
of changing the bottom elevation of the water. Additionally, the
slurry does not fall within the exception for trash or garbage in
agencies’ regulations because it is not a physical obstruction that
would alter the natural hydrology of the lake or cause a physical
hazard or other environmental effect. Since the slurry is a fill
material, the Secretary of the Army properly permitted the
discharge of it into Lake Temp under Section 404 of the CWA
Because the COE legally issued the permit, the involvement
of the Director of the OMB in the dispute between the agencies
regarding the permitting jurisdiction did not violate the CWA.
Executive Order 12,088 requires the Director to resolve disputes
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between the agencies at the request of the Administrator and in
accordance with any applicable laws.
Even though the
Administrator of the EPA was considering exercising her veto
authority over the COE permit, she ultimately took no action.
Decisions not to exercise enforcement authority, such as this, are
presumptively not reviewable per the Supreme Court’s decision in
Heckler v. Chaney. Finally, the jurisdictional decision by the EPA
and the COE should not be disturbed by this court because it was
neither arbitrary nor capricious under section 706(2)(A) of the
APA.
ARGUMENT
I.

NEW UNION HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE
THE COE’S ISSUANCE OF THE § 404 PERMIT
THROUGH ITS SOVEREIGN CAPACITY AS
OWNER AND REGULATOR OF
GROUNDWATER WITHIN ITS BOUNDARIES
AND THROUGH ITS PARENS PATRIAE
CAPACITY TO PROTECT ITS CITIZENS’
INTERESTS.

Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution requires the
existence of a case or controversy before an issue can be
presented to and ruled upon by the judicial system. U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2. Standing “is an essential and unchanging part of the
case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). A state may
achieve standing in its proprietary capacity when it suffers a
direct and concrete injury, in its sovereign capacity when it
requests resolution of boundary and water rights disputes, and in
its parens patriae capacity when it attempts to protect “quasisovereign” interests. Connecticut v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 97 (2d
Cir. 2000). Since the State of New Union achieves standing in its
sovereign capacity to adjudicate issues within its boundaries and
in its parens patriae capacity to protect its citizens’ interests, the
court below erred in concluding that New Union does not have
standing. Within the context of cases concerning the CWA,
standing may be recognized in any “‘person or persons having an
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interest which is or may be adversely affected.’” Friends of the
Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 629 F.3d 387, 396 (4th
Cir. 2011) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (g) (1987)). New Union will
be adversely affected as a state because any contamination to the
Imhoff Aquifer will occur in its boundaries and directly affect its
citizens. Further, New Union’s standing is not affected by failing
to comment or object to the Environmental Impact Statement
completed by the DOD because failing to raise issues during the
public comment period does not prevent interested parties from
judicially raising them later. Vt. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v.
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 247 F. Supp. 2d 495, 515-16 (D. Vt.
2002) (stating that neither the National Environmental Policy
Act nor the APA requires issue exhaustion).
A. New Union has standing in its sovereign capacity as
owner and regulator of a portion of the Imhoff
Aquifer under the relaxed standing test used for
states asserting a procedural right because there is
a continuous threat of injury through
contamination and the injury sought to be
prevented is directly related to agency action.
Despite the DOD’s ownership of Lake Temp, New Union
maintains sovereign power to contest any possible harm to it and
to regulate those things potentially affecting the portion of the
Imhoff Aquifer within its boundaries. This case is fit for judicial
review because there is a conflict between the rights of the United
States under their § 404 permit and New Union’s sovereign rights
as owner and regulator of potentially affected groundwater.
Thus, New Union achieves standing through its request for
adjudication of the water rights in question. Cahill, 217 F.3d at
97. In People of California v. United States, a factually similar
case, the Ninth Circuit declared that California maintained its
sovereign water rights over water flowing through a parcel of
land even though it was ceded to the United States for military
necessity because water rights are property rights that are
connected to the land. 235 F.2d 647, 656 (9th Cir. 1956). Thus,
New Union has a right to the groundwater within its boundaries
as owner and regulator of the land above that groundwater.
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In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the United States Supreme
Court set out the minimum requirements needed to achieve
standing by an owner of affected property. Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560-61. The plaintiff must show a “concrete and particularized”
injury-in-fact that is “actual or imminent.” Id. at 560. The injury
must be caused by the actions of the defendant and it must be
likely that a favorable decision will remedy the asserted injury.
Id. at 560-61. However, when asserting a guaranteed procedural
right, a state may achieve standing through a lesser showing.
1. New Union meets the requirements of the
relaxed standing test used for states asserting a
special interest in a procedural right
guaranteed to them by the APA.
Congress authorized, through the APA, a procedural right in
any party to seek judicial review of any agency decision or action
that adversely affects that party. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). This
procedural right to judicial review allows New Union to obtain
standing without strictly adhering to the usual redressability and
immediacy standards. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582
F.3d 309, 337 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572).
The requirements for states afforded a procedural right to
achieve standing were loosened further by the Supreme Court in
Massachusetts v. EPA, which held that a “litigant has standing if
there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the
injury-causing party to reconsider the decisions that allegedly
harmed the litigant.” 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007). New Union’s
requested relief for the issuance of a section 402 permit instead of
the issued section 404 permit will certainly cause the COE and
the EPA to reconsider its decision that led to the fear of
contamination of groundwater.
2. The reasonable fear of contamination to New
Union’s groundwater through surface pollution
is an established injury-in-fact.
A demonstration of environmental harm is not necessary to
establish an injury-in-fact. Gaston, 629 F.3d at 394 (citing
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167
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(2000)). All that is required is an assertion of a reasonable fear
and a concern that the injury-producing party’s actions may affect
the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff’s land. Id. Fear that the
further contamination of the aquifer would lead to a decreased
utility of the groundwater, as it may no longer be usable even
after chemical treatment, is reasonable, and therefore deserving
of judicial review.
Contamination of an aquifer by percolation of pollutants
through the ground is a recognized injury, making the fear of this
contamination reasonable. Miller v. Cudahy Co., 592 F. Supp 976
(D. Kan. 1984). In Cudahy, the plaintiffs presented results
provided from monitoring wells that demonstrated the
contamination of the groundwater. Id. at 984. While monitoring
wells have not been installed in Lake Temp or the aquifer to
determine the level of contamination, in Cudahy the court
determined that the impact from some of the pollutants seeping
down into the groundwater through surface spills was sufficient
to cause a reasonable fear and concern. Id. This shows that it is
reasonable to believe that pollutants introduced to the ecosystem
at the surface of the ground can eventually filter down to
groundwater causing injury through contamination.
It is not necessary to prove the chemical content of the
affected water or to even prove that there was “other negative
change in the ecosystem of the water” to establish an injury-infact. Gaston, 629 F.3d at 394. The Fourth Circuit further
elaborated that actual harm is unnecessary to establish standing
and found that a plaintiff must show only that “a direct nexus
existed between the plaintiffs and the ‘area of environmental
impairment.’” Id. at 395. The direct nexus in this case exists
between New Union’s ownership of the groundwater within its
boundaries and the threat of contamination of that water by the
United States.
The district court recognized, and the DOD does not dispute,
that if New Union attempted to obtain a permit to install
monitoring wells in Lake Temp, the DOD would not have granted
access to complete installation. Even if the wells were installed
immediately, conclusive results from the wells would not be
available until after the dumping of the fill material began.
Regardless of the lack of data, New Union does not need to prove
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the strength or timing of when the pollutants will begin to affect
the integrity of the water. Many times, “requiring a plaintiff to
demonstrate actual environmental harm in order to obtain
standing would . . . compel the plaintiff to prove more to show
standing than she would have to prove to succeed on the merits.”
Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1151
(9th Cir. 2000).
3. New Union’s complaint is directly related to
agency action and is the type of injury which §
404 was enacted to prevent.
Additionally, to establish standing through its sovereign
capacity, New Union’s complaint must be related to the agency’s
action under the statute and the injury must fall within the zone
of interests protected by that statute. Ky. Riverkeeper, Inc. v.
Midkiff, 2011 WL 2789086, 14 (E.D. Ky. July 14, 2011) (citing
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lueckel, 417 F.3d 532 (6th Cir.
2005)). The decision by the COE to issue a section 404 permit
undeniably qualifies as “agency action” under this requirement
and the fear of aquifer pollution through the discharge of fill
material into Lake Temp assuredly falls under the general
interests of the CWA to “restore and maintain [the] chemical,
physical and biological integrity of the nation’s waters,” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (1987), and also under the specific interests sought to be
protected by a section 404 permit relating to fill material.
B. New Union has standing to challenge the permit
through its parens patriae capacity because there is
reasonable fear that Dale Bompers, a New Union
resident, is under a continuous threat of injury
through the devaluation of his property.
In order for a state to bring suit in its parens patriae
capacity, a state must first “articulate an interest apart from the
interests of particular private parties.” Snapp v. P. R. ex rel.
Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). The state must also demonstrate
a quasi-sovereign interest in either the physical and economic
well-being of its residents or in its rights and role within the
federal system. Id. Then, the state must claim injury to “a
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sufficiently substantial segment of its population.” Id. Finally,
the state must show that the individuals who are claiming injury
could not be sufficiently redressed through a private lawsuit.
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009)
(quoting People by Abrams v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1982)). New Union asserts a reasonable fear of injury to both
quasi-sovereign interests and interests separate from involved
private parties. Also, the involved private parties will not be able
to obtain sufficient redressability through lawsuits.
1. New Union has a quasi-sovereign interest in
protecting the economic well-being of its citizens as
well as interests in preserving the integrity of its
natural resources and its sovereignty, both of
which are separate from the interests of the
affected private individuals.
New Union’s interest in preserving the integrity of its
groundwater and its sovereign power to regulate waters within
its boundaries are both separate from those of the involved
private parties, thus New Union satisfies the threshold
requirement for parens patriae standing.
These separate
interests are also quasi-sovereign because New Union has an
interest in maintaining its role as a state power and also as
protector of the economic well-being of its residents and the
natural resources within the state’s boundaries.
A state’s
protection of the economic well-being of its residents by
preventing the devaluation of their property is a “classic
example[] of a state’s quasi-sovereign interest.” Am. Elec. Power,
582 F.3d at 338. Currently, water from the Imhoff Aquifer can
only be used for agricultural purposes if chemically treated
beforehand. Fear that further water contamination will leave the
aquifer unfit for use even after treatment is reasonable. While it
is true that Bompers does not have rights in the groundwater
until he obtains a withdrawal permit, his fear of the elimination
of its utility makes obtaining a permit useless and creates a
sufficient concern for Bompers’ economic well-being. New Union
also has a legitimate quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its
natural resources. Id. at 334-35 (recognizing protecting natural
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resources as a legitimate quasi-sovereign interest since the turn
of the last century).
2. The aquifer’s contamination is an injury likely to
be prevented by New Union’s lawmaking power
that both directly and indirectly reaches a
sufficient segment of the population.
There is no bright line rule that specifies an amount or
proportion of the population that must be negatively affected in
order for a state to maintain parens patriae standing. La. ex rel
Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 2008)
(evaluating both direct and indirect effects in determining the
sufficiency of injury). Courts have consistently held that a good
indicator of whether or not an injury is sufficient to support
parens patriae standing is “whether the injury is one that the
State, if it could, would likely attempt to address through its
sovereign lawmaking powers.” Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607. The
contamination of groundwater within a state’s borders is
certainly a problem that a state would likely seek to rectify
through its legislature.
The willingness and likelihood of
attempting to address this issue through state legislation is
illustrated by the fact that New Union has gone through the
process of bringing a lawsuit.
Here, Bompers and future owners of his land and other land
above the aquifer in New Union establish sufficient injury
through fear of aquifer contamination from the discharge of
slurry into Lake Temp that could render it unusable even after
treatment and diminish the value of the property. See P.R. ex rel.
Quiros v. Bramkamp, 654 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1981) (including the
impact on future victims in its consideration of whether a
substantial segment of the population was injured).
3. New Union citizens cannot obtain satisfactory
relief through private lawsuits.
Bompers and future owners of his land and other lands above
the aquifer would be unlikely to achieve satisfactory relief
through a private lawsuit because without a withdrawal permit,
Bompers currently lacks rights in the groundwater. The state of
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Connecticut in Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. was able to
achieve standing partly because the court recognized that it
would be “doubtful that individual plaintiffs filing a private suit
could achieve complete relief.” 582 F.3d at 338.
Further, some courts do not require proof of an inability to
obtain relief through private suit. Bramkamp, 654 F.2d at 217
(stating “a state seeking to proceed as parens patriae need not
demonstrate the inability of private persons to obtain relief if
parens patriae standing is otherwise indicated.”). The ability of a
private citizen to obtain relief through a lawsuit may make
parens patriae standing less compelling, but this factor should not
be dispositive of parens patriae standing. Id. Moreover, the right
of a state to defend the interests of its current and future citizens
affected by the activities in question should not be left to the
possibility of one individual obtaining private relief. Id.
II.

LAKE TEMP IS NOT NAVIGABLE UNDER ANY
EXISTING STANDARD AND THE INTERSTATE
REGULATORY EXTENSION IS NEITHER
SATISFIED NOR CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID.

Despite having standing, the discharge of slurry into Lake
Temp does not fall within the jurisdiction of the CWA because the
lake is not navigable under 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a) or
1362(7). Since Lake Temp is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
CWA, the court below erred in granting the United States’ motion
for summary judgment.
Congress enacted the CWA to raise the nation’s overall water
quality level to a fishable and swimmable level by regulating
pollution discharges into surface waters, but the Act did not set
out to regulate all water quality. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), (2), & (3)
(1987). One jurisdictional limit is the requirement that the
regulated waters must be “navigable,” and Lake Temp satisfies
neither the plain language definition of “navigable waters” under
the CWA as “waters of the United States,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)
(2008), nor the requirement that non-navigable waters maintain
a significant nexus to traditionally navigable waters in order to
be subject to the CWA. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S.
715, 759 (2006) (plurality opinion) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
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Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 168 (2001).
The statutory text of the CWA does not extend jurisdiction to
non-navigable waters, so the administrative agencies attempted
to push the agency’s jurisdiction “to the outer limits of Congress’s
commerce power.” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 724. They attempted to
obtain jurisdiction over non-navigable waters by extending the
original regulatory definition from including waters “capable of
use by the public for purposes of transportation or commerce,” 33
CFR § 209.260(e)(1) (1974), to include all intrastate wetlands that
“could affect interstate or foreign commerce,” 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(a)(3) (1999). This expansion does not warrant Chevron
deference because it surpasses the agencies’ authority granted by
Congress and exceeds the bounds of constitutional authority. See
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. N.R.D.C., Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(explaining that reasonable administrative interpretations are
normally entitled deference); but see SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172
(declining to extend Chevron deference where the administrative
interpretation exceeds its constitutional grant of authority).
Even if the revised regulatory interpretation under Rapanos
is valid, Lake Temp does meet this proposed definition because it
does not play a substantial role in interstate commerce. This
Court should find that Lake Temp is not a navigable water
because the lake does not meet the statutory, case law, or
regulatory definition for navigable waters and also because the
attempted regulatory extension should be invalidated as an
unconstitutional federal intrusion into areas of state control.
A. Lake Temp, as an intermittent body of water with
no outlets, does not meet the statutory or case law
definitions of navigable waters.
Lake Temp, a non-navigable body of water with no surface
connection to any traditionally navigable waters, does not meet
the statutory definition or case law interpretations. The CWA
defines “navigable waters” as “waters of the United States.” 33
U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2008). The Supreme Court noted in Riverside
Bayview that while it may be acceptable to forego “traditional
tests of navigability” and include non-navigable waters connected
to traditionally navigable waters, the CWA does not support
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completely abandoning “navigability” altogether. United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133-34 (1985)
(noting that the concerns and goals of Congress indicate an intent
to regulate wetlands “inseparably bound up with the ‘waters’ of
the United States”). The connection to navigable waters is
necessary because non-navigable, intrastate waters that do not
substantially affect the waters of the United States are not within
the purview of regulation by the federal government. These
isolated, intrastate waters were not included in the original
statutory definition because intermittent waters, unconnected to
traditionally navigable waters, play no substantial role in
restoring and maintaining the integrity of the nation’s waters.
The Rapanos decision held that “navigable waters” must be
“relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water.”
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732. The Court did explain that the
connection to navigable waters did not exclude those bodies of
water that dry up in extraordinary circumstances or traditionally
navigable streams or rivers that dry up seasonally. Id. at 733
n.5. This logically includes waters that would otherwise be
navigable but experience either an “extraordinary circumstance”
or a seasonal dry period. Lake Temp does routinely run
completely dry, but, unlike the rivers and streams exemplified in
the exception, it is neither traditionally navigable nor connected
to a traditionally navigable water.
Lake Temp further fails the Rapanos concurrence definition
because the lake has no “significant nexus” to any navigable
water. Id. at 759 (plurality opinion) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(citing SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167). The close Rapanos decision
leads some lower courts to apply both the plurality and the
concurrence tests. United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th
Cir. 2009); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir.
2006); see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)
(explaining that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case . . .
the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.”); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d
1234, 1247 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that the narrowest grounds
usually mean the “less far-reaching common ground”). The
Rapanos standards announced in the plurality and the
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concurrence are quite different, and thus the controlling law is
unclear. Regardless, Lake Temp is an intermittent, isolated lake,
which does not meet either definition or a combination of the two.
Therefore, there is no jurisdiction under the CWA over discharges
into Lake Temp.
B. Even if the regulatory definition was an acceptable
extension, Lake Temp does not qualify because it
does not affect interstate commerce.
Courts cannot read “navigable” out of the Act completely by
allowing the replacement of the statute’s definition with an
interpretation so far removed from navigability that it allows
jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate, temporary bodies of water
like Lake Temp. The interstate commerce regulatory extension
was intended and previously applied only for regulation of waters
“inseparably bound” to navigable waters. See SWANCC, 531 U.S.
at 167-68; see also United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co.,
311 U.S. 377, 408-10 (1940) (explaining that jurisdiction does not
include every water from which one molecule might eventually
find its way into a navigable water). In SWANCC, the Court
clarified that jurisdiction under the CWA regulatory power was
not necessarily broad. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168 (noting the use
of the term “navigable” demonstrated the authority Congress
envisioned when it enacted the CWA and mandating that courts
construe this to require some kind of link to traditionally
navigable waters). The Supreme Court essentially recognized
that there has never been, and should never be, federal
jurisdiction over a water like Lake Temp that was neither
navigable nor connected to a navigable water.
The COE and New Union argue that Lake Temp is part of
the highway of interstate commerce for interstate hunters. This
argument is rooted in the power of Congress to regulate under
the Commerce Clause. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme
Court limited this power to three areas: (1) channels of interstate
commerce, (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce or
persons and things in interstate commerce, and (3) activities that
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Lopez v. United
States, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). Since Lake Temp is not
navigable, it cannot be classified as a channel of interstate
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commerce or be used as an instrumentality of interstate
commerce. The only area in which Lake Temp might be
regulated would be an activity that substantially affects
interstate commerce, but to meet this the impact must be
substantial. Id. at 559 (concluding that “the proper test requires
an analysis of whether the regulated activity ‘substantially
affects’ interstate commerce”).
Here, even if there is an effect, it is too minimal to meet this
requirement. Even if hundreds of hunters over the past hundred
years used the lake, of which there is no concrete proof, that is
only an average of a few hunters a year. Moreover, the few
hunters who allegedly use the lake are not legally permitted to do
so because the lake is on private military property, and there are
numerous “no trespassing” signs around the perimeter.
Regardless of the presence or absence of the hunters, New Union
has not offered any evidence that the hunters have any effect on
interstate commerce, much less a substantial one. Because the
hunters’ use of the lake is not only unsubstantiated, but also
insufficient to establish a significant effect on interstate
commerce, Lake Temp, isolated and unconnected from any
navigable water, does not meet the COE’s regulatory extension.
C. The COE’s interpretation is unconstitutional
because it exceeds the authority delegated to it by
Congress.
Even if there were a valid argument that the use of Lake
Temp affects interstate commerce, this extension would intrude
upon Progress’ sovereignty. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 556-57 (2000). The regulatory power granted to the COE
over navigable waters is always balanced against states’ police
power. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172-73. Congress did not
intend to circumvent the states’ control in land and water
management, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1987), but even without this
clear congressional intent, courts are still required to read
statutes to evade constitutional problems. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at
173. Progress is entitled to preserve their police power and
maintain their established rights to intrastate waters within
their boundaries. Federal agencies should cooperate with states
in an effort to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution in concert
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with programs for managing water resources. 33 U.S.C.A. §
1251(g) (1987).
The commerce power is closely tied to the congressional
purpose of the CWA to prevent any interference with the water’s
ability to be used in flow and stream of commerce. Appalachian
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 405-07. Isolated waters like Lake
Temp do not affect the flow or stream of commerce. Id. at 406.
Extending jurisdiction to waters not physically connected to
navigable waters goes beyond the authority delegated to the
agencies by Congress. It grants the COE substantial power over
a much larger range of land and water than was intended by the
CWA statute and would raise significant constitutional concerns
by altering the federal-state balance. Therefore, the Court should
find this extension invalid because it violates both the
Constitution’s delegation of state powers and the congressional
intent of the act.
Lake Temp is a larger lake than the waters at issue in
SWANCC, but the size of a water body does not automatically
grant jurisdiction. Even though the waters in SWANCC and
Lake Temp are not the same size, the two are analogous because
they both involve isolated wetlands with no connection to
navigable waters.
SWANCC and this case are completely reconciled when the
SWANCC holding is viewed in light of the Court’s reasoning. The
Court reiterated that the Commerce Clause, though broad, is not
unlimited. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173 (citing Morrison, 529 U.S.
598; Lopez, 514 U.S. 549). The crux of the holding was not the
size or use of the lake, but rather the constitutional issue of
maintaining the States’ traditional and primary power over land
and water use. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174. SWANCC was not
decided strictly on the facts, but rather it was a decision
restricting an overly extensive regulatory definition that pushed
the bounds of the CWA jurisdiction too far.
III.

IF THE COURT FINDS THAT LAKE TEMP IS A
NAVIGABLE WATER WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE CWA, THEN THE § 404
PERMIT WAS PROPERLY ISSUED BY THE COE
BECAUSE THE DOD’S SLURRY DISCHARGE
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WAS CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED AS FILL
MATERIAL.
If this Court finds that Lake Temp is a navigable water
within the jurisdiction of the CWA, then any discharge of a
pollutant into the lake by the DOD must be authorized. 33
U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2008). The DOD’s plan to spray the munitions
slurry into the dry area of the lakebed is aptly classified as a
pollutant discharge. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2008) (including in the
definition “munitions”). As such, the slurry must be authorized
by permit either under section 402 or 404 of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. §
1311 (1995). Section 402(a) provides that the Administrator may
issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant into waters of
the United States. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2008). Section 404,
however, provides that the COE, acting through the Secretary of
the Army, “may issue permits for the discharge of dredged or fill
material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.” 33
U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1987). The COE properly issued a section 404
permit for the DOD’s discharge of munitions slurry into the
lakebed of Lake Temp because the munitions slurry is fill
material under the CWA and corresponding regulations.
A. The discharge of slurry is a discharge of “fill
material” under the CWA because it meets the
regulatory definition set forth by both the EPA and
the COE.
The slurry will replace a portion of Lake Temp’s dry lakebed
and change the lake’s elevation, thus it is fill material and was
properly permitted by the COE under section 404 of the CWA. 40
C.F.R. 232.2 (2008); 33 C.F.R. 323.2 (2008). In Coeur Ala. Inc. v.
Se. Ala. Conservation Council, the Supreme Court held that the
CWA gave authority to the COE, not the EPA, to issue a permit
for the discharge of mining waste that was slurry. 129 S. Ct.
2458, 2468 (2009).
In Coeur, the COE issued a permit to Coeur Alaska, Inc. for
the discharge of mining waste into a lake in its efforts to reopen a
gold mine. Id. at 2463. The mining waste at issue consisted of a
mixture of water and crushed rock that was left behind in the
tanks after the froth flotation process. Id. at 2464. Rather than
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construct a “tailings pond” in which to dispose of this slurry,
Coeur wished to use a nearby lake to dispose of the slurry and
planned to deposit four and a half million tons of solid slurry. Id.
The effect of this discharge would raise the lakebed fifty feet and
almost triple the surface area of the lake. Id.
This slurry was correctly classified as fill material under the
agencies’ joint regulatory definitions that “fill material” is
“material [that] has the effect of [c]hanging the bottom elevation
of water.” 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2008); 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (2008).
Discharges of fill material are properly permitted by the COE
under 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). The Court also found that the
issuance of the discharge permit for fill material was appropriate
because the permit complied with the environmental factors and
considerations set forth in the EPA’s section 404(b)(1) guidelines.
40 C.F.R. § 230 (2008). The COE concluded that the reclamation
of the lake would result in an increase in wetlands/vegetated
shallows with a high value for wildlife habitat, despite the fact
that the immediate effect would be to destroy the lake’s small
population of fish. Coeur, 129 S. Ct. at 2465. The EPA did not
exercise its veto authority despite the fact that, in their opinion,
the slurry discharge into the lake was not the preferable means of
disposal. Id. This determination not to veto the permit was
further evidence of its appropriateness. Id.
In this case, the DOD’s proposed project will receive and
prepare munitions for discharge into the lake as a non-explosive
slurry. The slurry will be distributed evenly over the entire
lakebed, and the distribution will raise the lake elevation
approximately six feet. The surface area of the lake will increase
by approximately two square miles. Over time, alluvial deposits
from runoff from the surrounding watershed will cover the
lakebed and return it to its pre-operation condition.
The slurry is properly classified as a fill material because its
placement into Lake Temp will change the lake’s elevation level.
40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2008). Like Coeur, the EPA decided not to
invoke its power to veto the COE’s section 404 permit, and
implicit in the EPA’s determination is the conclusion that the
COE’s issuance of a section 404 permit is proper because the
discharge classification complies with the EPA’s section 404(b)(1)
guidelines.
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Fill material is not defined in the CWA, thus the respective
regulatory interpretations by the Administrator and Secretary of
the Army concerning fill material warrant deference. Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945). The
Court considers the ultimate criterion for determining
construction of an administrative regulation to be the
administrative agency’s interpretation, which becomes the
“controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation.” Id. The agencies determined that the
slurry that the DOD wishes to discharge should be categorized as
fill material under their regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2008); 33
C.F.R. § 323.2 (2008). Under Seminole Rock, this interpretation
is controlling because it is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulations, which are identical. 325 U.S. at 414. The
slurry will have the effect of changing the bottom elevation of the
lake, as written in the definition, and is properly classified as a
discharge of fill material. 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2008); 33 C.F.R. §
323.2 (2008).
B. The slurry is not trash or garbage under 33 C.F.R.
323.3(e).
The agencies’ regulations provide an exception to fill material
that may be permitted under section 404 of the CWA. 40 C.F.R.
232.2 (2008). Section 232.2 provides that “the term fill material
does not include trash or garbage.” Id. This exception came
about as a result of a joint rulemaking proceeding in 2002 by the
COE and the EPA revising the CWA’s regulatory definitions. 67
Fed. Reg. 31,129-34 (June 10, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
232; 33 C.F.R. pt. 323). This final rule sought to amend the
agencies’ regulations so that they would both have the same
definition of fill material. Id. at 31,129. This rule does exclude
discharges of trash or garbage from permitting under section 404,
even if those discharges had the effect of raising the bottom
elevation of a water of the United States. Id. at 31,134.
An important distinction must be drawn, however, between
discharges of trash or garbage and those of waste material—the
latter being acceptable to permit under section 404, provided that
they comply with the section 404(b)(1) guidelines. Id. at 31,133.
The agencies found that due to the similarity of some discharges

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/5

22

124 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 3
of waste to “traditional” fill, a categorical exclusion of all
discharges of waste would be overly broad. Id. Examples given of
trash or garbage in the rule include debris, junk cars, used tires,
and appliances. Id. at 31,134. The agencies found that the
discharge of trash or garbage often creates “physical obstructions
that alter the natural hydrology of waters and may cause physical
hazards as well as other environmental effects.” Id. Conversely,
the COE’s regulations were amended to add the words
“placement of fill material for construction or maintenance of any
liner, berm, or other infrastructure associated with solid waste
landfills; placement of overburden, slurry, or tailings or similar
mining-related materials” in the portion dealing with examples of
discharges of fill material. 67 Fed. Reg. 31,141 (June 10, 2002)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 232; 33 C.F.R. pt. 323).
The discharge at issue here is slurry, which is listed as
permissible in the COE’s regulations regarding discharges of fill
material. 33 C.F.R. 323.2(f) (2008). The DOD’s discharge of
slurry, while a discharge of waste under the Act, is not a
discharge of trash or garbage. In excluding trash or garbage
from section 404, the agencies were concerned with larger items
than the slurry that might impede the hydrology of a body of
water or cause a physical hazard. 67 Fed. Reg. at 31,134. The
ground munitions mixed into a slurry do not present such
concerns. The mixture will be sprayed evenly over the lakebed,
which will not affect hydrology or create any physical hazards.
Thus, the slurry is a permissible fill material under both the
COE’s and EPA’s regulations. 33 C.F.R. 323.2 (2008); 40 C.F.R.
232.2 (2008).
C. Under Coeur, the EPA may not require a § 402
permit if the COE has the authority to issue a § 404
permit.
In Coeur, the Supreme Court held that by specifying in
section 402 that “[e]xcept as provided in . . . [§404,]” the EPA
“may . . . issue permit[s] for the discharge of any pollutant,”
Congress forbid the EPA to issue permits for the discharge of fill
material falling under the section 404 authority of the COE.
Coeur, 129 S. Ct. at 2463.
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The EPA still regulates the discharge of fill material to a
certain extent through the promulgation of regulations issued
pursuant to section 404(b)(1), which govern the environmental
standards with which the discharge must comply. 33 U.S.C. §
1344(e)(1) (1987).
Additionally, the Administrator has the
authority to veto a section 404 permit, after notice and comment,
if she determines that the discharge “will have an unacceptable
adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and
fishery areas . . . , wildlife, or recreational areas.”
While the COE is not free to regulate discharges of fill
material without the oversight of the EPA, Congress provided
that section 402 permits are permissible as long as a section 404
permit is not required. Because the slurry at issue in the instant
case is a fill material subject to a section 404 permit, it cannot
also be subject to a section 402 permit from the EPA.
IV.

THE OMB’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE
PERMITTING DECISION DID NOT VIOLATE
THE CWA.

Congress delegated authority to the COE and the EPA to
administer the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1987), and because the
permitting jurisdiction of the two does not overlap, disputes
sometimes arise regarding whether a discharge is subject to a
section 402 or a 404 permit. Executive Order 12,088 (EO 12,088)
was signed in recognition of such disputes in an effort to ensure
compliance with applicable pollution control standards. Exec.
Order No. 12,088, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,707 (Oct. 17, 1978).
A. Executive Order 12088 requires the Director of
Management and Budget to resolve disputes
between Executive agencies at the Administrator’s
request and in compliance with any applicable
pollution control standard.
EO 12,088 compels each Executive agency to “cooperate with
the Administrator . . . and State, interstate, and local agencies in
the prevention, control, and abatement of environmental
pollution.” 43 Fed. Reg. at 47,707-08. Section 1-602 of that Order
provides that it is the Administrator’s duty to resolve conflicts
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between Executive agencies regarding the applicability of
pollution control standards, such as permitting under the CWA.
43 Fed. Reg. at 47,708. Additionally, Section 1-603 requires the
Director to seek the Administrator’s technological judgment and
determination with the regard to the applicability of statutes and
regulations. 43 Fed. Reg. at 47,708. In this case, the applicable
laws are the provisions of the CWA and the corresponding or
relevant regulations.
Finally, Section 1-605 stresses that
“nothing in [the] Order, nor any action or inaction under [the]
Order, shall be construed to revise or modify any applicable
pollution control standard.” 43 Fed. Reg. at 47,709.
In addition to the guidance of the Administrator, the
Director’s resolution of the dispute between the COE and the
EPA must comport with not only the provisions of the CWA, but
also any other applicable pollution control standard. 43 Fed. Reg.
47,709. The Director of the OMB is not allowed to resolve
disputes in a way that would conflict with or have the effect of
revising or modifying any applicable pollution control standard.
Id. The OMB’s involvement in the resolution of disputes between
the EPA and other executive agencies is limited to the extent
provided for in the Executive Order.
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, it was alleged
that the OMB overstepped the authority granted to it by
Executive Order 12,291 and unlawfully interfered with the EPA’s
promulgation of regulations. 627 F. Supp. 566, 567 (D.C. Cir.
1986). That Executive Order requires that executive agencies
submit all proposed and final rules to the OMB for review prior to
their publication. Id. The Order also provides that the OMB
must conclude its review within certain specified time periods
unless it notifies the agency of an extension, and the Order limits
that extension by authorizing it only to the extent to which
existing law permits. Id. at 568. The regulations at issue were
permitting standards under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act. Id. at 567. The statutory deadline for such
regulations was no later than March 1, 1985. Id. The OMB
disagreed with the EPA about the regulations, and refused to
clear the regulations, extending their review far past the
statutory deadline. Id. at 568. The court ultimately found that
the OMB did not have the authority to use its regulatory review
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power under the Order to delay the promulgation of the
regulations beyond the deadline in the statute. Id. at 571. The
court declined to issue injunctive relief against the OMB and
noted that doing so in that situation was “an unwarranted
intrusion into discretionary executive consultations.” Id.
The record does not describe the instant situation in great
detail, but mentions that the Director of Management and Budget
did get involved in resolving whether or not a section 404 permit
was proper for the DOD’s discharge into Lake Temp. It can be
inferred from the Director’s involvement that the Administrator
requested his assistance with the permitting decision since the
Administrator considered vetoing the COE’s section 404 permit.
Additionally, it can be assumed that the resolution was reached
through the assistance of the Administrator’s technological
guidance and determination of the applicable statutes and
regulations.
Any involvement by the OMB in dispute resolution is limited
by the constraints provided in EO 12,088, specifically that such
resolution must comply with any applicable pollution control
standards, such as the permitting provisions of the CWA and
their corresponding regulations and guidelines. 43 Fed. Reg. at
47,709.
As indicated by the title of the Order, Federal
Compliance With Pollution Control Standards, the purpose of the
Order was to ensure that executive agencies worked together to
achieve federal compliance with these standards. In resolving the
dispute between the EPA and the COE, the Director was carrying
out a Presidential Order to “take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. The COE properly issued the
section 404 permit because the slurry is a “fill material” under 40
C.F.R. 232.2 and 33 C.F.R. 323.2. Because the permit was
properly issued, the OMB’s resolution of the dispute between the
agencies did not violate the CWA.
B. The EPA’s decision not to veto the permit is
presumptively not reviewable under Heckler v.
Chaney.
In addition to the OMB’s resolution of the dispute being
necessary and proper, the EPA’s ultimate decision to not exercise
their veto authority pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) is
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presumptively not reviewable under the APA. Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). In Chaney, the plaintiffs were prison
inmates on death row who had petitioned the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) for the enforcement of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Id. at 823. The plaintiffs argued that the
drugs to be used in their lethal injections had not been approved
under the FDCA, and therefore violated the Act. Id. The FDA
denied their petition and the plaintiffs sought review of that
denial. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the
determination not to exercise enforcement authority was
presumed to not be reviewable. Id. at 831. The Court found that
decisions not to take enforcement actions were generally
unsuitable for judicial review for a number of reasons, such as the
balancing of a number of factors particularly within its expertise
and the similarity to prosecutorial discretion available to the
Executive Branch. Id. at 831-32. The Court noted:
the agency must not only assess whether a violation has
occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent on this
violation or another, . . . whether the particular enforcement
action requested best fits the agency’s overall policies, and,
indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake
any action at all. An agency generally cannot act against each
technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing. The
agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the
many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.

Id. This presumption may be rebutted where the substantive
statute provides guidelines for the agency to follow in its exercise
of enforcement authority. Id. at 832-33. Congress can use these
guidelines to limit the agency’s discretion in administering the
statute. Id. at 834.
The EPA’s decision not to exercise its veto authority is
analogous to the FDA’s decision in Chaney not to exercise its
enforcement authority under the FDCA. Here, the decision of
whether or not the EPA would veto the COE’s section 404 permit
was a wholly discretionary action and presumptively not
reviewable under the Supreme Court’s decision in Chaney or 5
U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2011). The EPA’s decision not to veto the
permit is generally unsuitable for review because such a decision
involves the balancing of factors particularly within the purview
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of the Administrator.
The Administrator must determine
whether a veto would best fit the EPA’s overall policies. Because
section 404 discharges are still subject to EPA regulations, the
Administrator may determine that the discharge can be properly
regulated under a section 404 permit.
Additionally, the
presumption is not rebutted in this instance because, like
Chaney, there is no law to apply. Congress did not limit the
Administrator’s discretion by providing guidelines in the CWA by
which the Administrator must make a determination of whether
or not to veto a section 404 permit. Because there is no law to
apply in reviewing the Administrator’s decision not to veto the
permit, the presumption has not been rebutted and the decision is
not subject to judicial review.
C. The jurisdictional decision by the EPA and the COE
regarding the DOD’s permit was neither arbitrary
nor capricious under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
Even if the Administrator’s decision not to exercise her veto
authority were subject to judicial review, that review would be
limited to the arbitrary or capricious standard in section
706(2)(A) of the APA. Russo Dev. Corp. v. Thomas, 735 F. Supp.
631, 635 (D.C. N.J. 1989). The Supreme Court, in Nat’l Ass’n of
Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, found that arbitrary and
capricious review is deferential to the agency. 551 U.S. 644, 657
(2007). An agency’s decision will not be overturned unless the
agency relies on “factors which Congress had not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.” Id. at 2529-30 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n. of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983)). The court of appeals found that the EPA’s decision in
Home Builders was arbitrary and capricious because the agency
relied on inconsistent findings regarding the applicability of
section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. Id. at 2529. In
reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court found that the
inconsistency to which the court was referring was an instance in
which the agency simply changed its mind. Id. at 2530. The
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Court explained further that, as long as proper procedures were
followed, the agency was allowed to change its position regarding
the applicability and requirements of section 7. Id. “[T]he fact
that a preliminary determination by a[n] . . . agency
representative is later overruled . . . within the agency does not
render the decision-making process arbitrary and capricious.” Id.
Similarly, the Administrator’s ultimate decision not to veto
the COE’s section 404 permit was not arbitrary or capricious
simply because the Administrator had considered vetoing the
permit at one point in time. In fact, the Administrator was
compelled to not exercise her veto power because the section 404
permit was required by the Supreme Court’s decision in Coeur.
The DOD’s discharge into Lake Temp was of fill material, as the
slurry would have the effect of raising the bottom elevation of the
lakebed. Section 402 of the CWA provides that the Administrator
may only issue permits for discharges into navigable waters if
section 404 does not apply. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2008) (emphasis
added).
The Coeur decision reaffirmed this sentiment, by
determining that the jurisdictional basis for permits did not
overlap, thus, if a discharge is subject to a section 404 permit, it
cannot also be subject to a section 402 permit. Coeur, 129 S. Ct.
at 2468. Additionally, nothing in the record suggests that the
Administrator made a finding that the discharge of slurry into
Lake Temp would have an adverse effect on municipal water
supplies, shellfish beds, fishery areas, wildlife, or recreational
areas. Because there has been no finding of adverse impact from
the Administrator, the EPA could not legally veto the section 404
permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1987). Thus the EPA’s decision not
to veto survives this Court’s review because it is proper under the
applicable statutes, regulations, and cases.
CONCLUSION
The State of New Union has standing in both its sovereign
capacity as owner of water rights within its boundaries and its
parens patriae capacity to protect its citizens. However, because
Lake Temp is not navigable, the CWA is not triggered and
regardless of New Union’s standing, the State has no ability to
contest the permit.
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Alternatively, if the CWA does apply, the current section 404
permit is applicable and proper because the DOD’s slurry
discharge is a fill material and the OMB’s involvement was both
legal and proper.
For the foregoing reasons, the State of Progress respectfully
asks this Court to reverse the decision of the district court
denying New Union’s standing claim, reverse the finding of
navigability and determine that Lake Temp is not under the
CWA’s jurisdiction or, in the alternative, affirm the District
Court’s determination that the section 404 permit was proper and
the OMB’s involvement did not violate the CWA.
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